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FORUM: COMMENT 
A Man Lost in the Gray Zone 
DAVID LUBAN 
The Rudolf Kastner trial was one of the three great scandals that rocked 
Israeli party politics in the 1950s (the others were the negotiations with 
Germany for Holocaust reparations and the so-called "Lavon affair"). Al-
though Leora Bilsky describes it as an "almost forgotten trial,"l it has not 
been forgotten by subsequent writers: it makes an important cameo appear-
ance in Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem; it features prominently in Tom 
Segev's The Seventh Million (1991); Yehuda Bauer's Jews for Sale? (1994) 
takes pains to refute the charges against Kastner; and it inspired two nov-
els-Amos Elon's Timetable (1980) and Neil Gordon's cerebral thriller The 
Sacrifice of Isaac (1995). But the legal opinions have never until now at-
tracted the thought or analysis they warrant, and Bilsky deserves gratitude 
for remedying this omission. With admirable insight and ingenuity, Bilsky 
focuses on the construction of the legal opinions as a form of literature. 
Her reading of Judge Halevi's and Justice Agranat's opinions centers on 
the way in which law is driven by metaphor-in Halevi's case, the meta-
phor of contract; in Agranat's, the metaphor of administrative decision 
making. Her article is a major contribution to our understanding of the 
Kastner case and to the way that, in a situation of intense moral ambigu-
ity, legal analysis can be predetermined by a choice of metaphors. 
I found Bilsky's critique of Halevi's opinion illuminating and accurate, 
with a few qualifications that I discuss below. Her analysis of Agranat's 
opinion and her own view of Kastner (which closely resembles Agranat's) 
raise more doubts. At the end of the day, however, I still find myself un-
able to answer the two basic questions, Who is Kastner? and How shall we 
judge what he did? 
I. Leora Bilsky, "Judging Evil in the Trial of Kastner," Law and History Review 19 (2001): 
118. 
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It seems that everyone has a story to tell about Kastner. For Arendt, "the 
strange Mr. Kastner"2 is an emblem of the feckless Judenriite, who turns 
out to be morally less interesting than Eichmann, the "devil" to whom 
Halevi's opinion says he sold his soul. For Segev, Kastner is a sympathet-
ic figure, deluded perhaps, but ultimately someone enmeshed in the same 
Sophie's-Choice-like game that every Israeli rescuer had been playing for 
years. The real story for Segev is the politics of the trial itself. Bilsky is 
more sympathetic to Kastner's plight than either of these authors, follow-
ing Agranat and Bauer in viewing Kastner as a resourceful Zionist rescuer 
taking a bold but unsuccessful gamble to save Jewish lives. By contrast, 
Kastner's persecutors saw him only as a symbol of the moral evil repre-
sented by the Mapai (Labor) Party, a self-seeking collaborator with Nazi 
evil. But, after pondering all these accounts of the Kastner story, I cannot 
escape the suspicion that the man and the choices he made remain funda-
mentally opaque and inscrutable. 
I have three aims in this comment: first, to explain the few hesitations I 
have about Bilsky's interpretation; second, to place Bilsky's work in the 
historiography of the Kastner case by contrasting it with Arendt's and Se-
gev's accounts; third, to explain why, at the end of the day, I fear that 
Kastner himself remains a cipher lost in the gray zone. 
I 
"The gray zone" is Primo Levi's label for the demimonde of Lager and 
ghetto inmates who imitated, collaborated with, or assisted the Nazis in 
return for marginally better treatment for themselves or others. They in-
clude the kapos in Auschwitz who bullied and brutalized their fellow in-
mates, the Special Squads who performed the physical labor of the gas 
chambers and crematoria, the clerks and helpers and camp administrators 
and ghetto bosses. Their motives varied widely: "terror, ideological seduc-
tion, servile imitation of the victor, myopic desire for any power whatso-
ever, even though ridiculously circumscribed in space and time, coward-
ice, and, finally, lucid calculation .... " Importantly for understanding 
Kastner, some were heroes playing a dangerous game of double agency. 
And some only thought they were heroes. 
Levi believes that we are fully entitled to exonerate or to condemn some 
of the inhabitants of the gray zone. But about others, he confesses impo-
tentiajudicandi. Consider the Auschwitz Special Squads-snatched direct-
2. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in lernsalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, rev. ed. (New 
York: Viking. 1963). 197. 
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ly from the boxcars, exhausted, bewildered, starving, then placed imme-
diately to work in the crematoria, on pain of instant death (only to be killed 
a few months later by their own replacements). Levi pleads as follows: "I 
ask that we meditate on the story of the 'crematorium ravens' with pity and 
rigor, but that judgment of them be suspended." Consider Chaim Rurnkows-
ki, the bizarre self-anointed "king of the Jews" who ruled at Nazi suffer-
ance over the Lodz ghetto, minting coins with his own image, yet some-
times taking substantial risks on behalf of his "subjects." Levi writes that 
man "becomes all the more confused ... the more he is subjected to ten-
sions: at that point he evades our judgment, just as a compass goes wild at 
the magnetic pole."3 
Levi's effort to probe and chart the gray zone is tremendously important, 
but even more important is his very acknowledgment that it exists. Com-
pare his nuanced approach, for example, with the view of Lucy Davidow-
icz, who categorically asserts that no Jewish leaders ever cooperated or 
collaborated with the Nazis. Davidowicz is able to reach this conclusion only 
because she identifies collaboration with treason: a collaborator was a Jew 
who hoped for a German victory. Yet she, too, acknowledges that, as the 
Final Solution took shape, some Jewish leaders tried to buy time by outfit-
ting and supplying the German army and that eventually none of them had 
any option except "bargaining with the Devil"-the very phrase that Judge 
Halevi hurled at Kastner, borrowed by Davidowicz, obviously with the 
Kastner case in mind, to defend the Jewish leadership. Surely, bargaining 
with the Devil places them in the gray zone; etymologically, anyone who 
worked side-by-side with Nazis col-Iaborated. But Davidowicz refuses to 
acknowledge shades of gray. Instead she quotes Zelig Kalmanovich: "'All 
are guilty, or perhaps more truly, all are innocent and holy. "'4 
By contrast, Levi writes from a sense of two irresistible pressures. On 
the one hand is the pressure of the facts themselves, a pressure to withhold 
judgment where the moral preconditions of judgment seem so sparse. On 
the other hand is the fundamental human need to make sense of morally 
significant events by passing judgment on the men and women who, what-
ever their role, brought them to pass. That is: despite his repeated pleas not 
to judge the unjudgeable, Levi understands that remaining agnostic in the 
face of evil is a defeat. We need a map of the gray zone. And that is not 
just because we have an emotional need to judge the unjudgeable, but also 
because not all of its inhabitants are unjudgeable. 
3. All the quotations come from Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, trans. Raymond 
Rosenthal (New York: Vintage, 1988),43,60,64. 
4. All passages quoted from Lucy S. Davidowicz, The War against the Jews, 1933-1945 
(New York: Bantam, 1975),348,352,353. 
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Where in the gray zone do we find Kastner, negotiating for the lives of 
his fellow townsmen and relatives, bargaining out Eichmann and Himmler's 
insane trucks-for-blood deal, testifying after the war on behalf of his Nazi 
bargaining partners? That Kastner belongs in the gray zone seems unde-
niable; but where he belongs in it, and whether he belongs among those 
who can be judged, remains obscure. 
II 
It was in April and May 1944, mere weeks before the beginning of the Final 
Solution in Hungary, that Kastner-a former journalist, a member of the 
Labor Zionist organization in Hungary, and vice-president of the Rescue 
Committee-negotiated the deal with Eichmann that formed the heart of 
the case against him. There are two differing accounts of the deal. Kast-
ner said that it was a Nazi offer to sell six hundred Hungarian Jews-later 
bumped to almost 1700-for six million pengo (about $1.6 million), which 
the Jewish community succeeded in raising. Eichmann reported the terms 
of the deal differently (although this was not known at the time of the 
Kastner trial): Kastner, said Eichmann, "agreed to keep the Jews from re-
sisting deportation-and even keep order in the camps--if I would close 
my eyes and let a few hundred or a few thousand young Jews emigrate il-
legally to Palestine. It was a good bargain."5 No matter which version of 
the deal is correct-both Eichmann and Kastner had ample motive to lie 
if the other's version is true-a total of 1684 Jews, carefully culled to in-
clude representatives of all major sections of Hungarian Jewry, were placed 
on a train to safety.6 (Borrowing Kastner's own biblical metaphor for the 
rescue train, let me label this the "Noah's-ark deal.") Damningly for Kast-
ner, they included almost four hundred from his hometown of Kluj, includ-
ing several of his relatives. The implication that Kastner had helped Eich-
mann by deliberately failing to warn the Hungarian Jews of the fate in store 
for them, and that he had done so in return for saving "his" 1700 people, 
is the most serious accusation against him. 
What was it like to negotiate with Eichmann? To get some sense of it, 
we may examine a second negotiation that Kastner was involved in, the 
trucks-for-blood deal. This story begins with Yoel Brand, a former Com-
munist activist, Zionist, and expert on the underground rescue of Jews. 
5. Quoted in Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (N(:w York: New View-
points, 1973), 543, from Life, 5 Dec. 1960, 146. The six million pengo figure also comes 
from Hilberg. I have not examined the newly released Eichmann memoirs on this episode. 
6. Bilsky says 1685 ("Judging Evil," 126), but the sources I have consulted all say 1684. 
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Around the time of the "Noah's-ark" deal with Kastner, Eichmann sum-
moned Brand to his office in the Budapest Hotel Majestic and said: 
Do you know who I am? I have carried out the Aktionen in the Reich-in 
Poland-in Czechoslovakia. Now it is Hungary's tum. I let you come here 
to talk business with you. Before that I investigated you-and your people .... 
And I have come to the conclusion that you still have resources. So I am ready 
to sell you-a million Jews. All ofthem I wouldn't sell you. That much money 
and goods you don't have. But a million-that will go. Goods for blood-
blood for goods. You can gather up this million in countries which still have 
Jews. You can take it from Hungary. From Poland. From Austria. From Ther-
esienstadt. From Auschwitz. From wherever you want. What do you want to 
save? Virile men? Grown women? Old people? Children? Sit down-and 
talk.7 
As the negotiations proceeded, Eichmann agreed to a piecemeal deal to 
demonstrate his honesty ("You think we are all crooks. You hold us for what 
you are. Now I am going to prove to you that I trust you more than you 
trust me.")-first, one hundred thousand Jews for a thousand trucks, then, 
for every additional thousand trucks an additional hundred thousand Jews. 
Eichmann told Brand that, as a sign of good faith, he would blow up Aus-
chwitz as soon as the deal was consummated (a blatant lie, as Eichmann 
had no authority to do anything of the kind). As a reassurance to the West-
ern Allies, Eichmann added that the trucks would be used only on the east-
ern front. 
That this "deal" was fantasy is obvious, and Brand understood at the time 
that the Allies would never tum over ten thousand trucks to their enemy. 
Nevertheless, he thought that by keeping negotiations alive he might buy 
time for the Hungarian Jews. In mounting urgency, Brand relayed the deal 
to Zionist authorities, who in tum communicated it to the British and the 
Americans, where it apparently went all the way to the desks of Churchill 
and Roosevelt. The result was an ill-fated journey by Brand to Istanbul and 
Aleppo, where (as predicted by Irgun agents who forewarned Brand as he 
boarded the train to Aleppo) he was promptly arrested by the British and 
spirited away to detention in Cairo. From the point of view of the British 
and the Americans, the deal represented nothing more than an effort to drive 
a wedge into their alliance with Stalin.s (Besides, as one British official in 
7. Quoted in Hilberg, Destruction of the European Jews, 724-25, from Alexander Weiss-
berg, Die Geschichte von Yael Brand (Cologne: Kiepenheuer and Witsch, 1956). 
8. Hilberg, Destruction of the European Jews, 542-44,723-28; Tom Segev, The Seventh 
Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust, trans. Haim Watzman (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1993), 94. For a detailed discussion of the complex deliberations and machinations of the 
Allies in the trucks-for-blood deal, see Yehuda Bauer, Jews for Sale? Nazi-Jewish Negotia-
tions, 1933-1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 172-95. 
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Cairo exclaimed, "But Mr. Brand, what shall I do with those million Jews? 
Where shall I put themT9) 
Kastner resumed the trucks-for-blood negotiations after Brand's fiasco, 
but to no avail. He continued to work with Eichmann's pliably corrupt 
assistant Becher until almost the end of the war, and in June he succeeded 
in bartering money and coffee for eighteen thousand Hungarian Jews, two-
thirds of whom lived out the war in Vienna. IO None too soon: when the Final 
Solution ended in Hungary in July, just two months after it began, more 
than four hundred thousand Hungarian Jews were dead. 
Apparently, Kastner viewed all of his negotiations as a continuous he-
roic effort of rescue; taken as a group, they make the Noah's-ark deal seem 
less exceptional and less suspicious. After the war Kastner moved to Isra-
el, where he eventually became press spokesman for the Ministry of Com-
merce and Industry and a Mapai Party candidate for the Knesset. The final 
episode relevant to the Kastner trial occurred when Kastner testified on 
behalf of Eichmann's assistant Becher at the latter's postwar denazifica-
tion trial. Kastner's affidavit stated that Becher (a self-dealing conniver 
whose specialty was financial extortion from desperate Hungarian Jews) 
had saved 85,000 Jews. It went on: 
There can be no doubt that Becher was one of the few SS It!aders who had 
the courage to take a stand against the extermination program and who made 
an attempt to save human lives .... Becher did everything he could, given his 
position, to save innocent lives from the blind, murderous rampage of the Nazi 
leadership. For this reason I never for a minute doubted his good intentions, 
even if the form and basis for our negotiations were of an objectionable char-
acter." 
The affidavit would return to haunt Kastner at his trial. 
The trial itself, we should remember, was a libel action against the semi-
crank semi-journalist Malkhiel Gruenvald, who had accused Kastner of 
collaboration with the Nazis, of conniving to save his own kinfolk and 
favorites, of enriching himself, and of secretly defending Becher. Gruen-
vald's accusations threatened to embarrass Mapai, so the attorney general 
(a Mapai member) pressured the reluctant Kastner into what is surely the 
most improvident libel suit since Oscar Wilde. 
GruenvaId was represented by an ambitious and talented right-wing law-
9. Hilberg, Destruction of the European Jews, 728. 
10. Ibid., 545. 
II. Quoted in Segev, The Seventh Million, 269. Segev claims that Becher's help to the 
Jews was merely an effort to create an alibi for himself, and Bauer reaches the same con-
clusion. Becher, who had substantial blood on his hands, lived out his years as a "respect-
able" multimillionaire bon vivant, with a taste for horseback riding and adultery. 
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yer named Shmuel Tamir. Tamir's defense was quite straightforward: he 
argued that Gruenvald had not libeled Kastner because the accusations were 
true. And one of Tamir's coups was to find and produce in court Kastner's 
affidavit in the Becher trial, after Kastner had testified that he had not re-
ally tried to help Becher. 
After Kastner was caught out in that small, embarrassed semi-lie, things 
only got worse. 12 Tamir produced as a witness Yoel Palgi, one of the dar-
ing Jewish paratroopers who had secretly dropped into Hungary on a mis-
sion of warning and resistance. '3 He testified that Kastner, fearful that their 
presence would land the Hungarian Jews in trouble, persuaded Palgi and 
a fellow paratrooper to tum themselves in to the Gestapo. Palgi eventually 
escaped, but the other paratrooper perished. And Tamir got Palgi to admit 
that he had lied about this incident earlier to cover for Kastner. 14 Judge 
Halevi's initially favorable views began to tum increasingly against Kast-
ner. Eventually, Halevi produced the opinion that forms the centerpiece of 
Bilsky's essay-an opinion that Segev describes as "one ofthe most heart-
less in the history of Israel, perhaps the most heartless ever."15 
III 
The most important part of Halevi's opinion, which Bilsky so incisively 
dissects, is this: 
The temptation was great. K. was offered the opportunity to save six hundred 
souls from the impending Holocaust. .. To rescue them would be both a per-
sonal achievement and a Zionist victory .... No wonder he accepted the of-
fer without hesitation. But "timeo Danaos et donaferentis" [beware of Greeks 
bearing gifts]. In accepting the offer, K. sold his soul to the devil. 16 
Bilsky rightly treats this passage as the centerpiece of Halevi's opinion, 
but we should not forget that his judgment turned on other findings as well. 
Halevi found that Gruenvald had written the truth about Kastner's postwar 
aid to Becher and that Kastner had lied about it on the stand. He dismissed 
as irrelevant the evidence of the trucks-for-blood bargain, even though it 
would have displayed the Noah's-ark deal in a more favorable light by 
12. I am taking this account of the trial from Segev, The Seventh Million, 266-71. 
13. The most famous of the paratroopers was the twenty-three-year-old poet and Israeli 
national heroine Hannah Senesh, who was captured by the Nazis, tortured (bearing up with 
legendary bravery and dignity), and executed. 
14. Segev, The Seventh Million, 272. 
IS. Ibid., 282. 
16. Quoted in ibid., 282-83. 
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showing that both were episodes in a continuing effort to save Jews, an 
effort involving many people besides Kastner. On the basis of Palgi's tes-
timony, Halevi held that Kastner double-crossed the paratroopers and, 
again, that Kastner lied when he stated that he had done all he could to help 
them. And Halevi held that Kastner had collaborated with the Nazis by 
bargaining for blood with them. 
So far as I can tell, Bilsky's analysis touches only the last of these find-
ings, not the Becher or paratrooper findings, which themselves are quite 
damaging to Kastner. Even if Halevi had not concluded that Kastner had 
made a diabolical contract with Eichmann, he might well have found that 
Kastner's behavior in the paratrooper episode-sabotaging their mission 
to avoid trouble-amounted to collaboration. By neglecting the Becher and 
paratrooper findings, I fear that Bilsky has moved Kastner into a whiter part 
of the gray zone than he deserves. 
Yet surely she is right that Judge Halevi's contract analysis, highlighted 
by his image of Faustian bargains and Greek gifts, presupposes a condi-
tion of arm's-length business normalcy wholly absent from the catastrophic 
world of terror and death that Kastner inhabited. A more telling case of 
being blinded by a metaphor would be hard to find. 
IV 
In Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt twice quotes Halevi's judgment that 
Kastner sold his soul to the Devil. 17 But she does not have the legal imag-
ery of contract on her mind. Rather, she sees in Kastner evidence for the 
major theses of her own book. 
The Eichmann book stirred a storm of controversy over two central the-
ses. The first was that the Jewish leadership, the Jewish councils or "Juden-
dite," had actively assisted the Nazis in peaceably rounding up the Jews-
not, to be sure, out of treachery, but out of the catastrophically false belief 
that expediting the roundup would make it less cruel. In Arendt's eyes, the 
leaders engaged in a kind of communal auto-euthanasia, behaving as if 
extermination was inevitable and their sole responsibility was to make it 
as painless as possible. Instead, the fact is that when the Jews did not ac-
tively aid their enemies, more of them survived, but when their leaders 
organized their own deportation, most perished. Her second thesis is that 
Eichmann's personality was not that of a sadist, a fanatic, an antisemite, a 
monster, a Richard III, or-please note-a devil. Rather, he exhibits the 
banality of evil. The Kastner affair sheds light on both theses. 
17. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 42, 143. 
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A reader who examines the dozen passages in Eichmann in Jerusalem 
discussing Kastner quickly realizes that he is Arendt's poster child for the 
sins of the Judenriite. (She either did not know or chose not to mention that 
Kastner never belonged to a Judenrat.) She accepts Eichmann's improba-
ble account of the Noah's-ark deal, namely that in return for some Jewish 
lives Kastner promised to help keep the Hungarian Jews docile. IS And her 
thesis could not be more condemnatory: "To a Jew this role of the Jewish 
leaders in the destruction of their own people is undoubtedly the darkest 
chapter of the whole dark story." Arendt expresses little doubt about their 
motivations-"we can sense how they enjoyed their new power"-and 
when she turns to Kastner "[t]he truth is even more gruesome." Why? Here 
she focuses on his efforts to include prominent Jews and functionaries 
among the 1684 destined for rescue. Analyzing what was "morally so di-
sastrous in the acceptance of these privileged categories," she paraphrases 
Kastner's thinking as follows: "it went without saying that a famous Jew 
had more right to stay alive than an ordinary one."19 
It went without saying because, of course, Kastner never said it. My 
sense is that although Arendt may have been right about Kastner, her judg-
ments outstrip what we actually know, which is precious little. No one ever 
accused Arendt of impotentia judicandi, and there is no sign in Eichmann 
in Jerusalem that she shares Levi's reluctance to judge anyone and every-
one in the gray zone. To be sure, the language she scornfully quotes from 
Kastner-that selecting who should live and who should perish "required 
more courage than to face death"2°-is bathetic and self-serving, particu-
larly coming from someone in comparative safety who was consigning 
others to their deaths. But it also strikes me as the way that an egotistical 
man (as Kastner apparently was21 ) might phrase his authentic sense of awe 
and inadequacy at the horrifying responsibility that had fallen his lot. Ego-
tism is a vice, not a sin. 
Arendt's merciless diagnosis of Kastner, seizing on his disagreeable 
phraseology as part of her indictment of him, exemplifies one of Eichmann 
in Jerusalem's central ideas: that in the "moral collapse the Nazis caused 
in respectable European society"22 wickedness invariably came cloaked in 
elevated phrases and orotund words. Arendt's method as a moral critic is 
to rip through those words and plainly describe the reality they try to con-
18. Ibid., 42. However, elsewhere in the book, apparently without noticing the inconsis-
tency, Arendt also accepts Kastner's version that the deal was a strict cash-for-lives trade. 
Ibid., 143. 
19. Ibid., 117, 118, 132. 
20. Ibid., 132. 
21. Bauer, Jews for Sale? 259. 
22. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 125. 
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ceal. Indeed, the central insight of the book, her diagnosis of Eichmann, 
is. that he is a man whose inability to confront reality without resorting to 
slogans and cliches rendered him incapable of thinking and therefore in-
capable of moral judgment.23 
This brings us to her treatment of Judge Halevi's image of Kastner sell-
ing his soul to the Devil. Astoundingly, Eichmann on the witness stand 
praised Kastner as someone who (like Eichmann himself) would do any-
thing for his ideals. Arendt comments with utmost sarcasm, "in Halevi's 
opinion, Kastner had 'sold his soul to the devil.' Now that the devil him-
self was in the dock he turned out to be an 'idealist,' and though it may be 
hard to believe, it is quite possible that the one who sold his soul had also 
been an 'idealist. "'24 
But of course what she really thinks is that Kastner had sold his soul, 
not to the Devil, but to a mediocre bureaucrat whose every attempt at self-
explanation made him seem ridiculous: "everybody could see that [Eich-
mann] was not a 'monster,' but it was difficult indeed not to suspect that 
he was a clown."25 
And it is also difficult not to suspect that Halevi's metaphor was in the 
forefront of Arendt's mind as she sat in the Jerusalem courtroom while the 
very same Halevi presided over a trial in which Eichmann was testifying 
about Kastner. If so, must she not have been thinking that Halevi, too, had 
resorted to a grand-sounding but false phrase, referring to Eichmann as the 
Devil when in fact he was not a devil, but a clown, and his bargaining 
partner was not Dr. Faust, but Dr. Kastner? Her reflections on the Kastner 
case may well represent the origins of her "banality of evil" idea. That idea, 
I think, is one of the major moral discoveries of the twentieth century. For 
all her insight, however, it is far from obvious that Arendt actually cared 
whether she got Kastner right. 
v 
To Tom Segev as well, Kastner matters only as an episode within two larger 
stories. The first, which Segev relates in great and depressing detail, is the 
story of how the Zionists of Palestine, both Labor and Revisionist, respond-
ed to the Nazi crisis. The story, in brief, is that they viewed it almost en-
23. Ibid., 47-48. This central idea of the book was elaborated in her essay "Thinking and 
Moral Considerations," Social Research 38 (1971): 417-46, perhaps her most important 
contribution to moral theory. 
24. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 42. 
25. Ibid., 54. 
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tirely from their own parochial political standpoints. Nothing expresses this 
better than an amazing statement Segev quotes from Ben-Gurion: "If I knew 
that it was possible to save all the children in Germany by transporting them 
to England, but only half of them by transporting them to Palestine, I would 
choose the second .... "26 Agents of both Labor Zionism and Revisionism 
combed through Europe, looking for "the best human material" to rescue 
(and trying to ensure that those they rescued would support the rescuer's 
politics once they arrived in Palestine). A leader of the Rescue Commit-
tee, to which Kastner belonged, wrote a memorandum in 1943 that asked, 
"Whom to save: ... Should we help everyone in need, without regard to 
the quality of the people? Should we not give this activity a Zionist-national 
character and try foremost to save those who can be of use to the Land of 
Israel and to Jewry?"27 
Viewed in this light, Kastner's careful gleaning ofthose 1684 Jews takes 
on a different coloration than either Halevi or Arendt gives it. To Segev, it 
represents something like the unofficial policy of the Zionist movement. 
(Segev does not mention, however, that Kastner conscientiously included 
virulently anti-Zionist Satmar Hasidim, and anti-Labor Revisionists, on the 
Noah's-ark train.)28 It was, furthermore, a policy that both Labor and Re-
visionism indulged in.29 But it took on a slightly more complex twist be-
cause Labor wanted to save those most committed to the pioneering spir-
it, while the Revisionists' constituency was largely the less politicized, 
nonsocialist East European masses. For that reason, Revisionism's politi-
cized selection criterion was to be unselective, to rescue as many as possi-
ble. This made the Revisionists look less elitist and more impartially hu-
manitarian, but Segev stresses that their calculation was every bit as 
political as that of Labor. 
The latter point is important to the second part of Segev's story, the 
politics of the trial itself. It was, in contemporary terms, not unlike the Paula 
Jones case: right-wing lawyers trying to humiliate the left and, if possible, 
to bring down the government. (It should be noted that the trial took place 
in an election year.) Not only was Kastner a Labor stalwart, his actions 
made a convenient symbol of what the right took to be Labor's orientation 
toward rescue during the war. The Revisionists hated him-hated him 
26. Quoted in Segev, The Seventh Million, 28. To be fair to Ben-Gurion, at the time he 
made this statement (December 1938), almost no one actually believed that Hitler meant to 
murder all the Jews. On the efforts of Ben-Gurion and the Jewish Agency to save Jews, even 
at the cost of nation building in Palestine, see Bauer, Jews for Sale? 184, 188. 
27. Quoted in Segev, The Seventh Million, 100. 
28. Bauer, Jews for Sale? 199. 
29. Segev, The Seventh Million, 40-45, 99-109. 
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enough, in fact, to assassinate him shortly before he was exonerated on 
appeal. 
There is more. In order to show that Kastner's "collaboration" with the 
Nazis had actually cost Jewish lives, Tamir argued that Kastner had delib-
erately withheld all he knew about Auschwitz and the Final Solution from 
the Hungarian Jewish community in order to remain on Eichmann's good 
side. Had he sounded the tocsin, Tamir intimated, the Jewish masses could 
have fled or resisted. Kastner and the iudenriite had exhibited the typical 
sniveling mentality of the exile, the very opposite of the tough and com-
bative mentality of Israelis.30 
Tamir's argument was based on two false assumptions: that the Hungar-
ian Jews did not already know what the Nazis had in store for them, and 
that had the Jews been warned they had opportunities to fight or flee. In 
fact, many escapees and refugees had come to Hungary bearing news of 
the Final Solution; the Hungarian Jews knew. The problem was that there 
was no place to run and hide in the Hungarian plain, and no time to orga-
nize resistance. 31 
According to Segev, Tamir's questionable argument played to a kind of 
collective neurosis that prevented Israelis from acknowledging the Holo-
caust or admitting that they had been just as helpless as the European Jews 
to do anything about it. Until the Eichmann trial in 1960, the Holocaust 
was something that happened to them, the other kind of Jew, the grovelers 
and connivers of the Diaspora. And Kastner's persecutors used the trial to 
forge an association in the mind of the Israeli public between Kastner, the 
Judenriite, the exile mentality, and Labor's policy toward rescue and im-
migration. It was a lethal mix. 
But Segev's analysis of the politics of the Kastner trial has very little to 
do with Kastner himself. Although he never states his own view of Kast-
ner explicitly, Segev makes it clear that he sympathasizes with the appel-
late opinion that cleared Kastner. He does not, however, say why. His point 
is basically that Kastner had only been doing what Zionist functionaries 
across the political spectrum did-compromise, rescue, and select on the 
basis of their movement's needs. 
30. On this theme in the Kastner trial, see Asher Maoz, "Historical Adjudication: Courts 
of Law, Commissions of Inquiry, and 'Historical Truth,'" Law and History Review 18 (2000): 
598-99. 
Notice that Tamir's is a different accusation against the Judenriite than Arendt's. She never 
indulged in Tamir's fantasy that the Jews might have fled or resisted, and in fact she argued 
that to accuse them of going like lambs to the slaughter is merely cruel. Her point was not 
that the Judenriite undermined resistance, but that they actively, if unwittingly, facilitated 
slaughter. 
31. Bauer convincingly refutes all Tamir's assumptions; see Jews for Sale? 150-61. 
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VI 
What shall we say of Justice Agranat's opinion, which (as Bilsky analyz-
es it), subsumes the Kastner case to the categories of administrative law, 
asking whether Kastner discharged his responsibilities reasonably under the 
circumstances? Here, the guiding metaphor is not the private law of con-
tract, but the public law requiring officials to balance the risks and benefits 
of their policies in a reasonable way, given the information available to them 
when they decide. 
One problem with this analysis is that Kastner was not a public official 
and had no political mandate for engaging in utilitarian calculation involv-
ing the lives of the community. A bigger problem is that the whole ques-
tion of what is reasonable under such insane circumstances, what counts 
as an appropriate weighing of risks and benefits, seems profoundly unan-
swerable. The trucks-for-blood negotiation is unimaginable, even after we 
somehow get over the threshold insanity of bartering trucks for blood. Did 
Eichmann (or Himmler, who masterminded the deal) actually think that 
Brand or Kastner could get the Allies to give ten thousand trucks to Ger-
many during the thick of the war? Could Himmler have believed Nazi pro-
paganda about the cabalistic power of World Jewry over the highest coun-
sels of the West? Did Kastner believe it?32 Did Himmler believe that the 
West was fighting the war solely on behalf of the Jews and would jump at 
the chance to save them?33 Did he think that by assuring the Western al-
lies that the trucks would be used only on the eastern front, he would ex-
cite their anticommunism? Did he actually want the Allies to reject the deal 
so that they, too, would have Jewish blood on their hands-or so that they 
would be placed in the perverse position of ratifying the Nazi view that 
Jewish lives count for nothing?34 
For that matter, did Eichmann or Himmler think that they had the au-
thority to release a million Hungarian Jews in return for the trucks? Even 
though the Fuhrer valued Jewish lives at less than zero, Eichmann and 
Himrnler knew only too well that he placed an enormous value on Jewish 
deaths. Why think that Hitler would relinquish them? 
All these questions about the motivations of Eichmann and his superi-
ors must have been going through the minds of Brand and Kastner. Even 
in the upside-down universe they inhabited, how could they have divorced 
themselves from the realization that the negotiation was entirely imaginary? 
32. According to Bauer, the answer is yes, although Brand was never under any similar 
illusions. See Bauer, Jews for Sale? 170. 
33. Hilberg, Destruction of the European Jews, 544. 
34. On this motivation, see Bauer, Jews for Sale? 167, 178, 186. 
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Did Kastner decide reasonably? On the one side lies the certain moral 
wrong of trying to deliver war materiel to the Nazis and of trafficking with 
murderers for months. On the other lies the gamble: a minuscule proba-
bility of saving a great number of Jews. Risk-benefit calculation is at its 
most dubious in "zero-infinity dilemmas," when probabilities are tiny and 
consequences enormous-that is why there is no such thing as an objec-
tively reasonable price for a high-stakes, one-in-ten-million chance Lotto 
ticket. In such cases calculation is only a caricature of rationality. Yet a zero-
infinity dilemma is precisely the gamble that Kastner anted in to at the cost 
of morally clean hands. For that reason it is deeply unc:lear that Justice 
Agranat was entitled to conclude that Kastner acted reasonably. Recall 
Levi's imagery: the reasonableness of Kastner's decision evades our judg-
ment, just as a compass goes wild at the magnetic pole. Bilsky has not 
persuaded me that the metaphor of administrative law is less misleading 
than Judge Halevi's metaphor of private contract. How can we speak of 
reasonable choice in circumstances where no choice is reasonable? Agranat 
was surely correct that Kastner did not act treacherously, but that conclu-
sion has little if anything to do with administrative law. 
VII 
Near the end of her article, Bilsky paints her own portrait of Kastner. For 
her, the sheer grandiosity of the plan to save a million Jews explains why 
Kastner found the gamble appealing. "Kastner was a Zionist committed to 
... activism, self-help, and self-assertion .... [A]s a Zionist, Kastner did 
not see himself limited to conventional ways of action ... and was will-
ing to try radical action such as negotiations with the Nazis over fantastic 
plans such as the 'blood for trucks' idea .... Kastner was not of the pas-
sive brand .... "35 
In other words, Kastner's actions can be explained by the fact that he 
had the opposite of the exile mentality that his persecutors and Judge Ha-
levi tagged him with. Nor was he as feckless as Arendt painted him. On 
the contrary: he was bold and resourceful, a visionary, unconventional, 
"can-do" Zionist Zorro. According to Bilsky'S interpretation, Justice 
Agranat's opinion, insisting that a judge put himself in Kastner's shoes and 
Kastner's mentality, recognizes that a high-stakes gamble might be reason-
able for such a man under the circumstances. 
Perhaps Bilsky is right; but, like Arendt's opinion in the opposite direc-
tion, it seems to me to overstep the evidence. Bilsky's portrait of Kastner 
35. Bilsky, "Judging Evil," 154-55. 
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does not readily square with Eichmann's testimony that Kastner offered to 
help pacify the Hungarian Jews in return for 1684 lives (perhaps Bilsky 
thinks Eichmann was lying, or that Kastner was just buying time); nor with 
Kastner's self-serving selection of his relatives and people from his home-
town for the Noah's-ark train; nor with Kastner urging the two paratroop-
ers to tum themselves in; nor with Kastner's efforts on Becher's behalf after 
the war.36 
Levi doesn't call it the gray zone for nothing. 
IX 
"From many signs," Levi writes, 
it would seem the time has come to explore the space which separates ... the 
victims from the persecutors, and to do so with a lighter hand, and with a less 
turbid spirit than has been done .... Only a schematic rhetoric can claim that 
that space is empty: it never is, it is studded with obscene or pathetic figures 
(sometimes they possess both qualities simultaneously) whom it is indispens-
able to know if we want to know the human species .... 
Was Kastner obscene or pathetic? Was he reasonable or heroic? Even af-
ter reading the insight-studded treatments of Kastner by Bilsky, Arendt, 
Segev, and Bauer, it seems to me impossible to answer these questions. In 
that case, how should a court of law have treated him and his accuser 
Gruenvald? Here I will tum to Levi for the last time: "The condition of the 
offended does not exclude culpability, which is often objectively serious, 
but I know of no human tribunal to which one could delegate the judg-
ment."3? 
If Levi is right, no court should have been placed in the position of con-
demning or exonerating Kastner-but, of course, the libel action and 
Shmuel Tamir's truth-defense left no room for the passive virtues: the court 
must either accept the truth of Gruenvald's accusations or reject them.38 It 
seems that whatever illumination we seek of the gray zone must come from 
36. Why did Kastner help Becher? His accusers intimated that it was to buy Becher's si-
lence, while Segev quotes a friend of Kastner's who believed that Kastner wanted to expe-
rience one more time the power over life and death. See Segev, The Seventh Million, 268. 
Bauer believes that Kastner simply thought Becher deserved help because he had helped to 
save lives. See Bauer, Jews for Sale? 250. I suspect Kastner had to believe that Becher was 
a worthy partner in order to believe that he himself played an honorable role working with 
'him. 
37. Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, 40, 44. 
38. As Maoz explains, this point was made in Justice Goitein's opinion in the Kastner 
appeal. See Maoz, "Historical Adjudication," 593-94. 
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elsewhere than the law. For Arendt, it comes from her theories of politics 
and moral psychology; for Segev, from his understanding of Zionist poli-
tics; for Kastner's enemies, from the contempt they felt for the mentality 
of the exile and their Labor adversaries; for Bilsky, from her idea of what 
is reasonable for a bold Zionist rescuer. Unfortunately, it may no longer 
be Kastner that is illuminated. 
